

Edited by
Andrew D. MacLean



CONTENTS

March-April, 1943

EDITORIAL COMMENT	- - - -	4
TRYING TO GET TO SEA	- - - -	5
PLANNING THE SUMMER CRUISE	- - - -	11
VOLUNTEER RESERVE PHOTOS	- - - -	9-10
FAIRMILES AND FOUL (Reprinted)	- - - -	15
NEWSPAPERS FEATURE NAVAL ENQUIRY	- - - -	32
NAVAL MINISTER REPLIES TO CHARGES	- - - -	34
YACHT CLUB ACTIVITIES	- - - -	38
MISTER EDITOR—READERS' LETTERS	- - - -	42

and many other interesting features

EXPLANATION AND APOLOGY

Our last issue was sold out three days after it was placed on sale.

As an estimated five thousand people tried but were unable to obtain a copy of last issue—this issue contains a reprint of all the best features of the last.

Twice as many copies of this issue have been printed than ever before and it is hoped no one will be disappointed.




Thomas W. Jacklin, Advertising Director

HUGH C. MACLEAN PUBLICATIONS LIMITED,
345-347 Adelaide Street West, Toronto.

Offices: 416 Main Street, Winnipeg; 110 Shelly Bldg., Vancouver; 75 East Wacker Drive, Chicago; and in Great Britain: V. A. Halford Limited, Mellow Meade, Riverside, Staines, Middlesex. The subscription price in Canada and Great Britain is \$1.00 per year; Fifteen Cents per copy. Advertising rates and circulation data on request. Manuscripts, accompanied by return postage, are welcomed from experienced writers or leading authorities on subjects of interest to our readers. *Publishers of:* Electrical News and Engineering, Electrical Appliances and Contracting, Engineering and Contract Record, Canada Lumberman, Canadian Woodworker, Furniture and Furnishings, Radio Trade-Tuilder, Shoe and Leather Journal, MacLean Building Catalogue, MacLean Building Reports.

Circulation statement audited by Canadian Circulation Audit Board.

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that takes our Time!

and the good old days of pleasure boat building are largely a memory until the seas are safe once more.

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We also feel cheerful when we consider the better equipment and added experience we will carry into the postwar years as a result of our present tasks.

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Better Men Needed Now

Every accusation of maladministration, of abuses and of inefficiencies in the administration of the Royal Canadian Navy, made in *BOATING MAGAZINE*, was brought to the attention of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services many months before publication. We did not wish to wash the Navy's dirty linen in public, but men are dying while Ottawa fuddles.

The fact that nothing was done by the Minister to correct known abuses is not so much the fault of the Hon. Angus L. Macdonald as to the whole system of government as it has been allowed to develop in Ottawa.

The Minister for Naval Services has replied, in the House of Commons, to but a few of these charges; he has neglected to comment on the broad issues involved and mars a none too capable defense of his Department by a personal attack upon the two war records of this editor.

There is no parallel in Canadian technical journalism to the furore that our last issue aroused from coast to coast. There appears to be no limit to the discussion, to the letters and to the references made to the article titled "Fairmiles and Foul."

No paper of such modest circulation could have aroused the nation as *BOATING* has done were it not for the generous co-operation of the daily and weekly press, which recognized in this article the first indication of the uneasiness that has been known to exist.

In and out of season—for almost a decade—*BOATING* has been working for reform of our Department of Naval Service. At last, we have achieved something worthwhile. The public, even official Ottawa, has been aroused. The matter now rests with Parliament. Do we get men in control of our Navy in whom the Navy itself and the public have confidence or must we continue to retain men who are not quite good enough?

Canada—her government, her institutions, her people—is fighting a second enemy. An enemy which penetrates from within. The power-hungry hordes of her own inept, her own misfits—those who never made a success of private enterprise and who are now in the employ of the government.

There are few Cabinet Ministers in Ottawa today who are in full and complete control of their department. This country and its fighting forces of free volunteers is directed by men far, far removed from the control of the peoples' vote.

Many of the most able men in Canada have gone to Ottawa only to return from whence they came, disgusted, discouraged and heartsick, beaten by the Ottawa Family Compact which will brook no outsider in its charmed circle.

Let us give you the names of four good men who have known this experience: James Duncan of the Massey-Harris Company; Victor Sifton, outstanding Liberal and publisher of the Manitoba Free Press; Elliott Little of the Anglo-American Paper Co., A. S. Nicholson . . . there are many others.


The attitude of the Canadian people to their political parties and to the machinery of government in this country is not dissimilar to the attitude of the people of France in 1939. If Canada were invaded who would lead us? If Canada were bombed where is a Churchill, a Bevin, to give us courage?

Boat Industry Different

The boatbuilding industry in this country is like none other. Although in normal times its output and turnover are relatively small it is composed of well over 200 concerns, very few of which have ever been able to make a reasonable profit. Many have hovered on the verge of bankruptcy for years: a fact which, incidentally, is very unfortunate for the chief customer of the industry—the yachtsman. Yet in the motor car industry of enormously greater magnitude (and highly prosperous at that) the number of builders of cars could almost be counted on the fingers.

Still speaking of normal times, boatbuilding is considered a craft (no pun intended) by the small boatbuilders and a manufacturing process by the large. How can the former, with their minute output, compete with the latter with their very much larger productivity? Only because of their willingness apparently to live on air, is the criticism of the bigger concerns. And there is no doubt that prices of pleasure boats, large and small, have in the past been unremunerative to the builders in many instances. How much so, it is impossible to say, for cost accounting is notoriously vague in the industry and losses have to be made up on repair work, etc., much to the annoyance and dissatisfaction of the yachtsman.

From all of which it may be gathered—and it is common knowledge among yachtsmen as well as among boatbuilders — that the industry has been in a very unsatisfactory state and it is clearly to the advantage of all, including the yachtsman, that this condition should not be perpetuated after the war.



Trying to Get to Sea

by
Andrew D. MacLean

WHAT follows is a narrative originally written for the information of a few personal friends. Those that have read it have been so strongly of the opinion that it would be "in the public interest" to publish it that we have decided to do so. Although the experience of one man who desired only to serve his country, it is typical of the experience of many others—and should, for that reason, be of interest to our readers.

On the 31st of August, 1939, I telegraphed the Director of Naval Reserves at Ottawa: "Beg to offer my services in any capacity warranted by my experience."

The Naval Secretary replied on the first of September: "Your offer of service by telegram of the thirty-first of August is noted with appreciation. As an officer on the Retired List, and consequently liable for service, your name is already noted." But not until the twenty-third of December did I get a copy of this letter, as it had been addressed to a place where I had not lived for four years! Although I had been most careful since Hitler had started to create trouble to keep Ottawa and the Toronto RCNVR informed of my permanent business address as well as that of my home.

Two years later I learned how it came about that the Naval records—usually so accurate—failed to reveal my proper address.

It seems that on the outbreak of war the splendid card index records, that had been carefully brought

up to date in accordance with the Emergency and Mobilization Plans, were destroyed. An RCN officer, suddenly mobilized and unfamiliar with these new records, threw them into the wastepaper basket and proceeded to call up reserves from records a decade old.

Every officer, his health, his age, his qualifications, was listed on these cards that had been so painstakingly prepared for a sudden mobilization—where he was to go and what he was to do. The destruction of these records was a very serious loss and retarded efficient mobilization by several months.

As the only working journalist then in the RCN VR, my job was designated as Naval Press Liaison Officer for immediate mobilization. Commander Eustace Brock, RCNVR, an insurance salesman of Winnipeg, got the job which he held until August, 1940, when he was sent to England as Liaison Officer to the Admiralty. The usefulness of an insurance man in dealing with the press is left to the judgment of the reader.

The Naval Information Branch now has a staff the size of a medium sized daily newspaper with an annual salary list of \$35,000 and the majority of the staff, being in uniform, take their orders from and issue propaganda only as approved by the permanent force RCN.

Having received no acknowledgement of my telegram, I visited Ottawa on the fifth of September. I saw Pay Commander C. O. Youle, RCN, Captain C.

R. H. Taylor, RCN and Captain Leonard Murray, RCN—then Vice Chief of Naval Staff. The latter explained at some length that there were no openings available. Yet everyone with a little political pull was being commissioned at high rank while experienced men were told, as was I, that until ships were built—there were no commissions being granted.

It was so patently evident that my services were not desired for reasons of an article that had been published in "Boating Magazine" some time before (commenting on the lack of interest Ottawa evinced in small motor craft), that I requested permission to submit my name for the consideration of the British Admiralty, which I did on the eighth of September.

There were some friends in high places in the Old Country, but still, Pharaoh hardened in heart and would not let the children of Israel go. Whether the refusal of the Admiralty had something to do with Mackenzie King's Statute of Westminster—I do not know. I was not alone in my desire to serve with the Royal Navy, and as far as I can ascertain, even retired officers of the Royal Navy resident in Canada were retained by the Canadian Navy where their knowledge and experience was used—but only to the extent that it would not interfere with the great ambitions of the permanent force RCN.

The Naval Selection Board travelled about the country interviewing men whom the local RCNVR officers had recommended for commissions. This selection board interviewed these candidates as if they were criminals. Men who desired only to serve their country in any capacity but preferably the most dangerous.

How many they accepted and how many were turned down no one will ever know. Many I do know that were turned down applied to Army and Air Force and discharged their responsibilities in those spheres with distinction.

The RCAF lost many a good man to the RAF that way. Men who have since become great aces. The RCAF, however, being more largely run by the volunteers and not the permanent force, soon saw their error and a couple of years ago cleaned up their recruiting machinery.

Party politics had, undoubtedly, an important influence on who got the opportunity of joining the Navy but I, for one, do not believe an excessive number of really bad appointments were so made. After all, if a Member of Parliament or a Minister of the Crown makes a recommendation he does so with some care for he may have to answer for it on the floor of the House or in the press. The same applies to contracts for supplies, etc.

Where the abuses crept in, and in astonishing numbers, can be laid on the doorstep of the Headquarters Staff, their allies the Civil Service and their tea-party friends in the capital.

For years the people of Canada have seen bureaucracy become more powerful. Today, in the midst of a war for our survival and in which our military successes have been negligible; there are very few Cabinet Ministers in Ottawa who are anything more than the mouthpiece for what their departments desire the public should know. Among the three defense departments only the Hon. G. C. Powers,

Minister for Air, has any real control over what goes on. Mr. Power is an able man and he has the very strong support of the many able civilians who constitute the bulk of the executive positions in the RCAF. There are doubtless permanent force difficulties in the RCAF but from the splendid record of this service they must be much in the minority or men of ability.

There are hundreds, thousands, of stories about appointments to His Majesty's Royal Canadian Navy, the RCNR and the RCNVR. Here's one reputed to be accurate: A certain retired officer of the Royal Navy, resident in Canada, wrote Ottawa on the outbreak of war and offered his services stating his experience which was of a kind urgently wanted at the time. After some months had passed he was summoned to Ottawa and the Director of Personnel said:

"We are glad you came, when can you start?"

"It will take me a week to dispose of my business and straighten out a few affairs."

He returned to his home, sold his business at a sacrifice, arranged other matters and reported to the same officer a week later.

"Well, here I am ready to go to work," he said.

"I'm afraid I don't understand, I never saw you before in my life."

In October 1939, I was one of a party of journalists that visited Halifax and were shown around the dockyard and taken for a couple of hours' run in a minesweeper. I was so shocked with the lack of energy evident that I wrote Mr. Grant MacLachlan, private secretary to the Hon. Norman Rogers, Minister of National Defence on the nineteenth:

"In confirmation of our conversation of Monday last, I desire to accentuate the following points:

1. After only three days of painstaking observation and discussion with naval personnel at Halifax, I decided that, instead of writing an article that could only be of such a nature as to seriously embarrass the government, I would advise the Minister of the situation, confident that suitable action would be immediately instituted.

In short, it was my belief that:

2. Naval defences and convoy escorts in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and off the Atlantic Coast are inadequate to meet expected operations of enemy submarines or surface vessels . . . and that no further ships are being immediately acquired . . . and that nothing is being done to improve the fighting ability of those already in commission.

3. Our minesweeping vessels are ill-equipped, in poor mechanical condition and manned by inexperienced officers and men . . . and in no way ready to meet enemy attack or to efficiently sweep mines.

4. Lack of co-operation between Navy, Army and Air Force commands in the Halifax area.

5. The officers of the RCNVR who in times of peace gave generously of their time to bring themselves and their men to an admittedly high state of efficiency have, in the last month, entirely lost confidence in the judgment and ability of the Naval Staff.

6. Too large a percentage of appointments to important positions have been made on grounds that cannot be justified. In this alone the Department already faces a serious scandal that has not yet come to a head because of the natural reticence of naval personnel, but I cannot emphasize too strongly that insubordination is already in evidence.

7. The ship and boat building industry has no confidence in the judgment of the Naval Staff as to the type of ship that is recommended for purchase. Officers of our Merchant Service and experienced yachtsmen are well aware of the serious mistakes of the past, and fully anticipate that they will be repeated unless this most important part of our naval defence is placed in capable hands.

If a small committee appointed by the Minister and reporting to him was immediately called, it might be possible to act on their recommendations in time to avert

serious attacks on the ships bearing the Canadian Active Service Corps in Canadian coastal water.

This committee should consist of (1) Captain on the Active List of the Royal Navy and named by the Admiralty; (2) Senior civil servant with naval experience; (3) a retired RCN officer of rank of Commander; (4) Private Secretary to the Minister; (5) Retired officers of the RCN, with previous war experience in that service; (6) Retired officer of the RCNVR with war experience in the RNVR. (Note: The Honorary Naval Advisory Committee to the Minister of National Defence was presumably formed to function in such a crisis as this, but the RCNVR has no confidence whatsoever in its representatives thereon.)

In conclusion, permit me to say that I write the above with full appreciation of its significance, and sincerely trust that the Minister recognizes its importance."

Looking back on this trying period, I now realize that I should have established myself in Ottawa and called every morning and every afternoon upon NSHQ. I should have purchased an insurance policy from a certain company and been seen with the right people in the Land of Afternoon. I had, however, a living to make in Toronto and a yachting magazine to edit that was being swamped with indignant letters from those who wished to get into the Navy and had been insulted for their patriotism by the stuffed shirts of Ottawa—and from boat builders who wanted to build boats for the fighting forces but could not make head nor tail of the weird specifications issued by the air force and navy.

The Hon. Norman Rogers was then Minister of National Defence, controlling Navy, Army and Air Force. He conceived the idea that the Navy and Air Force, both users of small motor boats, should get together on the matter of design, supply of engines and equipment and should call for tenders in a uniform manner through the War Supply Board.

To direct such a plan and to serve as liaison officer between the two services was obviously a job in which I might give satisfaction. On the advice of friends very close to the Government, I made application to the Royal Canadian Air Force and passed my medical examinations in November 1939, with the idea in mind of possibly being accredited to both services.

In January I again approached the NSHQ and receiving no encouragement from either Commander Youle or Captain Taylor, I saw Rear Admiral Percy Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff. I asked him if there was anything on my record that prevented me being employed in any capacity. He replied that my record was in the clear and I should get an appointment in the early Spring. My appointment came through in July for employment in September. Contrary to Admiral Nelles' assurance I had the best inside information that certain articles that had been published were the true reasons and the only reasons why I was to be the only RCNVR officer not called up in 1939.

Meanwhile my application in the RCAF only waited space to put me, and in April 1940 I received a commission as a Flight Lieutenant (C 1860) in the navigation branch. I reported for duty to the big training station at Trenton, Ont.

The Commanding officer was Group Captain Sully, RCAF, now Air Commodore and Director of Personnel. My immediate superior was one of the finest men I have ever met and a highly skilled navigator, Squadron Leader Frank Millar—that rare avis: a permanent force officer with brains.



DEPT. OF UTTER CONFUSION (D.U.C.)—the new Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa said to be one of the largest wooden structures in the British Empire.

After some preliminary training which was very hard on the feet, I assumed command of the local rescue boats and inaugurated the First RCAF Marine Training School, putting a couple of hundred through an all-round course of small craft handling, seamanship, elementary engineering and pilotage. The majority of the airmen that graduated have received excellent promotion. The best of my Marine Section boys (with the rank of Sergeants) know more about gasoline marine engines than any Engineer



DISMANTLED FOR PARTS—HMCS Lynx that was to have been another Mother Ship but was broken-up in error. Adequate depot facilities are essential for efficient operation of small craft.

Commander RCN that I have ever met. The RCAF have some good examples of the boat builders' art. The Navy's harbour craft are an abomination.

I was very happy at Trenton, in my work and with the hundreds of men that I had known in civil life; and the kind remarks of Group Captain Sully, when I was leaving, lead me to believe my presence was appreciated.

On the thirteenth of July while in my office at the RCAF Marine Section, I received a long distance phone call from the Chief of Naval Personnel asking if I was interested in visiting all the yacht clubs in Canada, recruiting and taking to Great Britain on loan to the Royal Navy, fifty yachtsmen. My reply was, as the reader can well imagine, very much in the affirmative and I wired next day to confirm. Although my health was good, my forty-three years precluded me from any hope of operational flying with the RCAF even as navigator in a heavy bomber. Commander Sheddon, then in command of the Toronto RCNVR, forwarded me the following letter which had been addressed to me in his care:

"I am directed to inform you that the Department of National Defence (Naval Service) can now offer you an appointment as Lieutenant Commander, RCNVR, provided you are medically fit.

You would be required to report for duty at Naval Service Headquarters on the first day of August, 1940. Your appointment at Naval Service Headquarters would be of a limited duration prior to service on loan to Royal Navy.

An early reply is to be sent to the Naval Secretary,

Naval Service Headquarters, in order that arrangements for medical examination may be made."

Here at last, and in black and white—was a chance to do a job of work for the Navy in Canada and to serve again in the Royal Navy. My reply dated the sixteenth of July 1940, addressed to the Naval Secretary, was as follows:

"1. Your letter, dated July 13th, has been received and contents noted. The offer of active service is appreciated.

2. Your communication has been forwarded to the Chief of Air Staff, through the proper channels, for his decision.

3. The rank of Lieutenant Commander RCNVR, offered is not thought appropriate for the responsibilities involved in the recruiting of senior yachtsmen for commissions in the RCNVR, for active service outside of Canada.

4. My seniority on the Retired List is that of Lieutenant Commander as of March, 1935, and several officers obviously my service juniors now hold the rank of Commander.

5. The rank of Lieutenant Commander is not sufficiently attractive to induce me to resign my commission in the RCAF where I now enjoy serving.

6. It is respectfully submitted that the temporary and acting rank of Commander, RCNVR, be considered as warranted for this appointment."

My RCAF discharge came through on the last day of July and, having every reason to assume that the RCAF and NSHQ were collaborating in the transfer, I signed the necessary papers and reported in Air Force uniform to the Chief of Naval Personnel, who informed me that my letter of the sixteenth of July was not appreciated by the Naval Board and that someone else had been appointed in my stead. I asked why then, had I not been so informed? They



J. J. Taylor & Sons, during part of 1942, were employed by the Royal Canadian Navy making alterations and additions to Fairmiles by other builders in addition to fulfilling their own orders. Photo shows four such boats at the Taylor plant in Toronto. Nothing was wrong with these boats but the Taylors were employed making last minute changes decided upon by Ottawa.

had not thought of that. The Naval Service wrote me on the second of August as follows:

"In view of paragraphs 2 and 4 of your letter of the 16th of July in which you stated that you do not consider serving under the rank of Commander, RCNVR, Headquarters' Letter NS. 103-M-11 of the 13th July is cancelled.

It is also noted that you joined the RCAF without informing Naval Service Headquarters.

If you desire to serve as Lieutenant Commander, RCNVR consideration will be given to calling you up for service in that rank for loan to the Royal Navy in the near future.

A reply regarding this should be forwarded to Naval Service Headquarters in due course."

My letter to the Naval Secretary has been carefully considered by some of the best legal brains in Canada and their opinion is that it is not an unwarranted reply in view of my repeated endeavours to join the Navy, nor does it in whole constitute a refusal to serve as a Lieutenant Commander . . . and paragraph 6 of my letter is certainly polite enough. It was suggested that I return to the RCAF, but I would not do that. Fortunately, a friend approached the Hon. C. B. Power, Minister of Defence for Air, who was acting as Minister of Naval Services, pending the arrival of Angus L. Macdonald; and laid the above correspondence in front of him. Mr. Power had had no reason to wish to assist me in anything, but this was such a flagrant case of maladministration and persecution that he took up his mighty effective ability on my behalf.

I was denied the job of collecting the yachtsmen, but was to travel with them to England.

Although I was told by the Chief of Staff that the job of collecting the yachtsmen had been filled, Lieutenant Henry K. Hill, RCNVR, was not commissioned until the eighteenth of August, more than

a month after NSHQ had received what they choose to interpret as my refusal to take the job.

Lieutenant "Hank" Hill had had no previous naval service and found the job rather difficult. Later he served brilliantly in command of a trawler in the Mediterranean and on return to Canada in 1942 commanded Q 058 and later the corvette Calgary. He left the Fairmile service when the dissolution of all our dreams came in May, 1942.

On the eighth of September, I left Toronto in charge of the following party of Lieutenants RCNVR: Ross F. Wilson, R. H. Corbold, Art E. Evans, Tommy C. Skelton, G. D. Cook, R. Hart, Kenneth With, E. Bill Pearce, W. S. S. Fowler and Jack A. Bennett and reported to Halifax where we got another medical examination—the fourth service medical examination I had had in less than a year. After a short gas course we boarded a special train for Montreal.

Additions to our party were Lieutenants RCNVR: T. G. Fuller, W. A. Lemon, K. McRae, O. B. Allan, Claude Campbell, Ned Ashe, G. H. Smith, J. C. H. Calland, J. L. Harries, K. G. Glass, F. R. Stuart, J. T. Sharpe and Denis J. P. O'Hagan. We also had ninety officer cadets who were destined to do three months or more on the lower deck of RN ships. Yet these lads were of better quality than the vast majority of commissioned officers that had been taken into the RCNVR since the outbreak of the war. Further, we had a couple of hundred T.124 officers and ratings from RN armed merchant cruisers returning to England on leave.

We arrived in Montreal in the early afternoon



ENGINEERING GRADUATES WHO HAVE JUST COMPLETED NAVY COURSE. From left to right are shown M. R. Maynard, B.A.Sc., University of Toronto, mining engineering; John P. Woods, B.Sc., Nova Scotia Technical College, mechanical engineering; John F. Pink, B.Sc., University of Manitoba, electrical engineering; H. V. Carson, B.A.Sc., University of British Columbia, electrical engineering; J. F. Williams, B.Sc., Universities of Manitoba and Queens, mechanical engineering; Robt. A. Coombes, B.Sc., University of New Brunswick, electrical engineering; Douglas C. Waring, B.Sc., University of New Brunswick, engineering; Kenneth M. Gilbert, B.Sc., University of Toronto, mining engineering; Jas. C. Pratt, B.Sc., University of Manitoba, electrical engineering; Wm. S. Gibson, Canadian Vickers Limited, marine engineering.

and sailed next morning, the fourteenth of September, in the Duchess of Richmond.

On arrival in Britain our ratings left for Torbay, the merchant seamen disappeared into their beloved Birkenhead; and we proceeded to the South coast via London. Railway travel was badly disorganized that twenty-fourth of September, from the heavy air attacks. We in our two great lorries visited several London stations before we found one that could supply a train. We arrived at our destination tired and in a blackout that seemed particularly black.

HMS King Alfred was a brick and mortar ship with a splendid Captain and a very fine understanding of how to treat and train volunteer officers.

We were photographed for our identity cards and interviewed by the Captain who had my last war record and consequently sent me on leave pending an appointment in command. The other officers stayed for another six weeks.

The reader will realize that now, if he has followed us this far, we have reached a point in this narrative when for reasons of security I cannot give all my movements, nor reveal the location of certain naval establishments.

I arrived in beloved London on a lovely Autumn afternoon and registered at the Park Lane Hotel for no other reason than I had heard that the 48th Highlanders of Toronto used it frequently. For the next week we had heavy raids every night which I had begun to hate and fear. Even the joy of seeing incendiaries burning on the roof of the Bank of Montreal—where I had a substantial overdraft, did not relieve the tension that night bombing brings. I was to be many times heavily "blitzed" by day but never felt as terrified as in the darkness of the blackout. Lying on my face in Piccadilly Circus is not my idea of how to enjoy a war.

A week of London was enough so I moved to Weybridge thinking that the country would be quiet. The Hun dropped bombs within fifty yards of me in daylight and a couple of heavy anti-aircraft guns outside my window lifted me out of bed with blasts by night.

Shortly I got orders to take a course in anti-submarine work which lasted a month. I was then appointed to command HMS St. Zenon, a very fine

(Turn to page 45)



RECENT RCNVR GRADUATES—Top Row—Sub-Lieutenants: J. C. McCauley, Toronto; Gene Sheedy, Toronto; Edward B. Kendall, Gravenhurst; Esmond Butler, Weston; R. B. Robson, Walkerville. Middle Row—Donald Clarke, Toronto; J. W. Allan, Toronto; Durrand Waller, Winnipeg; John Ferguson, Weston; A. C. Ericson, Toronto. Bottom Row—D. B. Love, St. Martin's, N.B.; James Spencer, London; F. R. Gilbert, Brockville; Paul Finlay, Montreal and T. R. Hilliard of Carleton Place.

The hesitation of an officer to discuss his superiors, the natural desire of a man to avoid the attacks that criticism brings in this Canada of ours; has too long strangled the voice of reform. In Britain and in the United States where a vibrant, living democracy flourishes—the press is not slow to reveal the imperfections of their fighting services . . . their fighting men benefitted and the conduct of the war is improved.

Fairmiles and Foul

(REPRINTED FROM LAST ISSUE
BY POPULAR REQUEST)

by
Andrew D. MacLean

(Commander RCNVR, retired. Formerly Senior Officer Fairmiles. Served in Submarine Chasers with RNVR in Great War I, in the RCAF and with the Royal Navy in Great War II).

IT IS quite possible that before the end of the war, naval motor craft may, in numbers, exceed those of all other naval types. Their building, operation and maintenance involve highly specialized knowledge and experience. The British Admiralty's recognition of this fact is evidenced by the appointment, early in 1941, of an Admiral whose sole duty is "to co-ordinate and superintend the maintenance and development of the motor flotillas and the training of their crews." The full value of this large fleet of small craft can only be obtained if their machinery is operated with due regard to the difference between such engines and those installed in steam-driven ships and if the upkeep of the machinery is effected on a thoroughly organized basis with depots in charge of and manned by experienced men, trained in the maintenance of high-speed petrol and Diesel engines.

This represents a new development for the navy and must be recognized as such. When large numbers of boats are in question it is not always difficult, temporarily, to hide deficiencies in maintenance. Hence boats and machinery may easily get a bad name wholly because those who run them and are responsible for the upkeep, are not of the right type or are not possessed of sufficient knowledge and experience.

The ground staff which carries out the maintenance of aeroplanes is very highly skilled and trained. A considerable number of motor boats have machinery which is virtually of the same design and requires equal care in its upkeep if the service is to be effective. It is sometimes forgotten that most of the larger motor boats have machinery of higher power than in the average tramp ship, and many of them engines of much larger output. A tramp ship carries three or four engineers who are fully trained, and the machinery of such a vessel is certainly not so complicated nor in need of such skilled knowledge as that, for instance, of an M.T.B. with three engines of 1,000 hp. each running a 2,000 r.p.m., not to speak of the delicate accessory plant for which the engineer is responsible. It is obvious, therefore, that an



MOTHER SHIP—HMCS Venture II, formerly HMS Seaborn, depot ship for Fairmiles on the Atlantic.

organization of some magnitude will have to be built up and on its efficiency much will depend."

I quote the above from the "Motor Boat Magazine" of England—a recognized authority in its field.

I quote it because of its special significance in Canada where the senior officers of the Canadian Navy prefer to run things in their own particularly obscure manner . . . and make no difference between the training of Fairmile crews and the maintenance of the 600 hp. Hall-Scott engines than they do for men and the steam machinery of corvettes, minesweepers and destroyers.

What follows is, I regret to say, too much the personal experiences of an individual; but is typical, I venture to believe, of what is going on in this Canadian Navy of ours. There are many hundreds of



"D" TYPE FAIRMILE of the Royal Navy punching into a head sea in the Straits of Dover. This type is V bottom, faster but not as suitable for bad weather as the "B" type.

others who could write of similar experiences; but they, perhaps wisely, have not done so.

The ethics of what a retired officer may write in the public press are not clear. The responsibility of a citizen to expose inefficiencies in the public services is beyond question. Yet it is with considerable hesitation that I place in type the following narrative, encouraged only by the hope that, in so doing, reforms may be instituted that are so necessary before those of our men who serve at sea may be assured of all that they require.

We have attempted to build a navy of fifty thousand men and many hundreds of ships with the same Senior Officers that did not make much of a showing with our peace time navy of two thousand men and a half dozen "tin pot" ships.

My naval service in this war began in September 1940 when I, and fifty other "yachtsmen", were sent to England on loan to the Royal Navy. I worked there a year in convoy trawlers and at a Fairmile building, manning and training port.

On the 28th of August 1941, I reported to HMCS Stadacona, the Halifax base establishment, and there followed the usual five or six days in which everyone wondered why I was there and what had I come to do. Finally, I requested to see the Rear Admiral G. C. (Jetty) Jones, RCN, Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, who thought of a really novel approach to the problem. He asked what were my qualifications. On advising him that I had been sent back to Canada to help with the Fairmile submarine chasers that were a-building, he appointed me to the staff of Captain D, at that time Captain Rollo Mainguy, RCN, under whose administration these boats would come when they materialized. By such ability to get to the root of a problem are Admirals made.

A few days later I was rushed out of Halifax with three officers for each of four boats building on the Great Lakes. Although I pointed out that when I had seen the boats some two weeks before it was obvious they would not be ready for a month or more. As a matter of fact, we arrived in Toronto on the 8th of September and were not ready to sail until the 1st of November and my boat, Q 052, was the second boat to leave. Twelve officers and seventy-two men did nothing useful to the winning

of the war for some six weeks—multiply this by the dozens of larger ships that had been incorrectly reported as ready for crews and you will get a figure of a little less than five or six hundred men not only unprofitably employed but, who, being denied leave to visit their homes, got knocking about town to the detriment of both the town and themselves. Over my most violent protests exactly the same thing happened in the Spring. Twelve boats had complete crews provided three months before they were needed, or one hundred and ninety-two officers and men with nothing to do for ninety days!

As a concrete example of how far adrift Ottawa was on what was actually going on, a memorandum was issued on the 18th of June, 1941, over the signature of the Naval Secretary in regard to the Manning of C.M.L.'s (Fairmiles) I quote:

"The first Fairmile building on the East Coast will probably be ready for delivery in the middle of July and thereafter, they will be delivered at fairly regular intervals."

The first Fairmile to be delivered (uncompleted) to the Navy was Q 054 on the 14th of October at Toronto and she had to be largely rebuilt at Halifax. Of the nine boats that were completed to an extent to permit them to steam to Halifax by December 1941 only four were ready for operational duties by the 1st of February, 1942.

Only nine boats reached Halifax of the twenty-four that had been ordered for delivery during 1941. Five boats were paid-off in Halifax during December because of an artificial shortage of officers created by the opening of special schools before we had enough people to man the ships so urgently needed at sea.

As a result of my experience as Acceptance Officer for the British Admiralty on these identical Fairmile Motor Launches, I was able to assist the Canadian boat builders in many small problems. It was, however, impossible to advise or assist NSHQ on anything as they were convinced in their own minds that the mere fact of their being on the staff of NSHQ qualified them fully to avoid any problem. In the matter of steering and certain very vital bridge arrangements, I made the strongest representations and was slapped down in the crudest manner. I had the doubtful satisfaction of seeing them adopt the majority of my suggestions twelve months later.

The dinghy supplied for the Canadian Fairmiles

was a joke. Heavy beyond belief, it would not handle under oars or sail and was unsafe with more than two people on board. These boats cost \$275.00 and were not nearly as good as a standard yacht dinghy available on the open market at around \$60.

Captain Mainguy, RCN, added his complaints about the life saving equipment supplied but nothing was done—even when Lieut. Bob Jarvis, RCNVR (C.O. of Q 057) pointed out to Vice Admiral Percy Nelles, RCN, that the dinghies were a menace to life and limb.

The guns supplied were from eighteen to thirty years old and the ammunition of United States origin and very doubtful history. Although a qualified gunnery officer myself my recommendations in respect to the fire power of the Canadian Fairmiles was shelved. The useful excuse that nothing better was available is a terrible indictment of those that should have planned a supply.

As no organization of the boats into Flotillas had yet been laid down, I recommended on the 11th of September, 1941, that a Flotilla consist of twelve Fairmiles grouped in three Divisions of four boats each. This was a set-up that had proved satisfactory in two wars and was particularly suitable for conditions as I found them in Canada. The four-boat-division was of particular interest as it assured Operations of always having three boats available for duty while one was in reserve for repairs, refueling or rest. My senior officer, Captain Rollo Mainguy, RCN, forwarded the above recommendations to Ottawa on the 16th of September, 1941. No Flotilla organization has yet been put in operation at this date of writing (November, 1942) although Ottawa did by signal, dated 2nd of March, 1942, lay down an impractical six-boat-Flotilla plan that has not been adhered to because boats were despatched to operational areas without regard to their Flotillas. No flotilla leaders have been named—an oversight that deprives the boats of much of their efficiency.

In December, 1941 I urgently requested permission of Capt. Miles, RCN (who had relieved Capt.

Mainguy as Captain D, Halifax), to call officially upon NSHQ and discuss our problems of Fairmile organization. This was refused.

In January, 1942, I requested that, if the RCN would not listen to my precise information as to how Fairmiles were organized and operated in Great Britain, I be allowed to proceed to England and obtain the very latest written orders and data for our guidance. This also was refused as, it was stated, I could not go over and get back in time before our new boats came down river. It was said they would arrive in April—the first arrived in July.

The twelve-boat-Flotilla plan warranted the employment of Lieutenant Commanders as Flotilla Leaders to be available both for base duties and for operations at sea when they would be accommodated as additional officers in the boats of their choice. The Divisional Leaders would be senior Lieutenants.

All Fairmile commissioned officers were of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve and the majority had had some experience with small craft previous to volunteering for active service. The majority of the crews were also RCNVR with two or three RCNR professional seamen among them. The Chief Motor Mechanics are a fine lot of men mostly from the Pacific coast with sea experience and RCNR qualifications.

Contrary to my recommendations no special training was given our officers or men on being accepted volunteers for the Fairmiles service. The British Navy found this absolutely essential in the last war and in this—but the RCN thought they knew better.

By August, 1942 out of more than thirty boats in commission only ten were fit for operational duties as a direct result of Ottawa's failure to provide specialized training and adequate, specialized base facilities.

The first four Fairmiles to be completed at the builders' yards were given (by me) temporary organization as the First Division of the First Canadian Motor Launch Flotilla as follows:



TYPICAL FAIRMILE CREW and hailing from every province in the Dominion. Officers are Lieut. Bruton Strange, C.O. of Q 082; Lt. Cdr. A. D. Maclean, SOF, and Lieut. O. Greening, C.O. of Q 085. The gun served in the Boer War.



LESSON IN FIRE POWER for the RCN. Picture shows Fairmile of the Royal Navy on patrol in the North Sea.


- Q 052—Lt. Cdr. A. D. MacLean in command
 Sub. Lieut. S. O. Greening
 Sub. Lieut. A. B. Strange
 (Builder: J. J. Taylor & Sons, Toronto)
- Q 054—Lieut. S. B. Fraser in command
 Lieut. C. L. Campbell
 Sub. Lieut. P. M. Thornton
 (Builder: Greavette-Sachau, Toronto)
- Q 057—Lieut. R. A. Jarvis in command
 Sub. Lieut. J. F. Gallagher
 Sub. Lieut. N. M. Simpson
 (Builder: Minett-Shields, Honey Harbour)



OUT OF THE WAR—three Fairmiles that failed to clear fresh water before freeze-up in 1941. Of the twenty-four boats ordered for delivery that year, only nine reached Halifax and only four were put in service.

- Q 060—Lieut. H. E. Farncomb
 Sub. Lieut. C. W. Hyslop
 Sub. Lieut. E. K. Ellis
 (Builder: Hunter, Orillia)

The reader may be thinking that the tone of this article is highly critical of the efficiency of the Canadian Naval war effort. The point the author desires to make, with what little ability he has, is that our efficiency is limited by the employment of permanent force naval officers in all "key" posts. Were important executive jobs given to the many hundreds of capable business and professional men, of known ability in civil life, serving in the RCNVR



SUBMARINE ATTACK—HMCML Q 052 at full throttle overtaking corvettes whose depth charges have just detonated. The superior speed of the Fairmiles is of great advantage in dealing with submarines. (RCAF photo).



TRIALS PARTY—Chris Neilson of Hall-Scott, Robert Pierson of NSHQ, Stan Usher of Kermath, Lieut. Stew Fraser, C.O. of Q 054, Petty Officer Wooding, and Warrant Shipwright Neil, RCNR.




BOATING EDITOR, Admiral Usborne of the Fairmile Company, Chris Neilson, Bob Pearson, Lt. Browne and Bill Taylor at trials on Lake Ontario November, 1942.

the story of the building of the Canadian Navy would have been quicker and better.

The Canadian public is justly proud of the courage and the efficiency of her navy but it is the purpose of this article to point out that it is the NR's and VR's who deserve the credit. It is they who did the dirty work and what has been accomplished has been

through their untiring efforts and their continued prodding of the somnolent permanent force.

Q 052 was now nearing completion as far as the contractors were concerned and my Number One



PRACTICE ATTACK ON SURFACED SUBMARINE—two corvettes turning "hard a starboard" to bring all their guns to bear on the "enemy". Fairmile Q 052 can be seen protecting the Royal Netherlands Navy submarine from the attentions of ships that were not practicing. (RCAF photo).



CHIEF MOTOR MECHANICS were good. Many of them deserved commissions.

(Bruton Strange—Owen Greening having gone to Q 053) and I were anxious to get away. We started to make arrangements and saw the Resident Naval Overseer (Lt. Cdr. (E) J. H. Goodwin, RCNVR) as no NOIC had yet been appointed for Toronto and no one knew who was in charge of what, and the acting SNO would not speak to the RNO and vice versa. Formal signals were sent through the RCNVR barracks to the NOIC Montreal and repeated to NSHQ requesting pilot (orders were to use pilots although these people were unaccustomed to small, high power ships and were the cause of much unnecessary damage) and giving our expected time of arrival at the Oka Sand Pier, Montreal.

We had signalled our time of departure at 0900 on the 1st of November but as no pilot had reported at 0930 I shoved off for Kingston, after having signalled Ottawa and Montreal, for the pilot to meet us there. We arrived at Kingston at eleven that night and lay near the RCNVR barracks and alongside the old steam yacht Magidomo that Geo. Fulford of Brockville had donated to the Navy as he had his 70-foot gasoline cruiser Moby Dick.

We sailed next morning at an early hour and found we had drawn from the pilots' pool the same good man that had taken Q 054 down river. We arrived in Montreal two days later, having stopped for the nights en route, without incident.

We remained two days in Montreal making good minor defects, taking on stores and provisions and sailed for Quebec with another pilot. Aside from a miniature whirlwind coming up river against tide and current immediately under the Quebec bridge, we had an uneventful passage. The short, steep seas we experienced in this little bluster broke our wheelhouse windows. The Fairmiles are unsuited to short, steep seas and, as a matter of fact, behave better in the long Atlantic swell than they do in the chop of the English Channel. The racing schooner Bluenose, designed for winter fishing in the North Atlantic, which she rides like a duck, nearly shook her sticks out in a blow off the Devon coast.

At Quebec we took on fuel and were ordered to have our compasses adjusted by local talent although a very satisfactory job had been done in Toronto. It cost the Canadian taxpayers some fifty dollars to have the compasses of every boat fiddled with at

this port. All the Fairmile adjustments had to be made again on arrival at Halifax.


We arrived at Halifax, stopping at Gaspé for fuel, in company with the minesweeper Drummondville on the 11th of November 1941 after a run of practically 1200 miles from Toronto.

One of the most distressing facts about the building of Fairmile Motor Launches in Canada was the method by which the contracts were placed. The best equipped yards and those that had the greatest experience and the skilled labour got the fewest orders. Companies that had to build plants before they could build boats got orders to build the most boats.

On my Weekly Progress Reports to NSHQ, made during the months of September and October, 1941, I appended comments such as the following:

"Dates shown are only approximate as serious delays have been caused by lack of main engines, fuel tanks and other items of equipment. At least two boats would have been in service in June if intelligent priorities had been ordered. In every case the boat builders have been seriously delayed by the non-arrival of parts that were to have been supplied by Ottawa."

In this respect engines were delivered to some



OTTAWA TOLD US that our guns were as big as we could carry. Photo shows 13 pounder on 80 footers of last war which were highly satisfactory.

yards six months or more before they were required and other builders could not get any at all when they needed them. The inspection was quite inadequate and the boat builders got no co-operation in the translation of the weird specifications supplied and the confusion that existed in the blue prints. On the 20th of September 1941 I advised Ottawa as follows:

"The inspection of boats during construction and co-operation with the builders on details not shown on the blue prints has been infrequent and inadequate."

The official mind was merely resentful and did nothing except make excuses that qualified inspectors were not to be found—yet a half dozen of the ablest foreman shipwrights in Eastern Canada were available and doing their damndest to get a chance to help in the war effort. One of our Naval inspec-

tors was, I am told, a doorman at a large hotel. Anyway he had a uniform.

The more technical side of the Fairmile equipment was in an even more disgraceful state of official ineptitude. Ottawa insisted on maintaining the English standard voltage of twenty-four instead of employing the North American standard of thirty-two or one hundred and ten. Consequently all our motors—some eight or ten to each boat—generators and lamps had to be specially built. As new equipment was fitted increased loads fell upon the electrical supply and two changes have been made to increase the power of the dynamos and storage batteries. Instead of one standard voltage the Canadian Fairmiles now have batteries and dynamos, motor and lights for both twenty-four and one hundred and ten volts which is translated in alternating current for special purposes. Some NSHQ jackass says that 110 volts is too dangerous for wooden ships! Yet we had 550 eighty footers in the last war with 110 volts and experienced no difficulties whatever.

Every Canadian officer who returned to Canada after two years or more service on Royal Navy Fairmiles would make the same remark to me after a couple of weeks in the Canadian Naval service:

"What in hell is wrong with this Navy? Don't they think we learned something about these boats and how they should be run after our experience?"

Is it any wonder that those Canadians who were fortunate enough to go on loan to the Royal Navy try to get back again rather than serve under the RCN?

One of our most humorous experiences concerned the type and quality of food supplied to the Fairmiles by the Central Victualling Depot for ships based at Halifax. In Britain it is customary for most ships to purchase their own provisions from Navy stores and from civilian sources; the Navy paying a victualling allowance to each officer and man. In Fairmiles, minesweepers, corvettes and other so-called auxiliary vessels, officers and men eat the same food from the same galley. Individual messes, Wardroom, Petty Officers, etc., adding to their fare such extras as they desired in the way of soups, fruits and preserves and catsup which are not sup-

plied by the Navy but can be purchased from the ship's own or base canteen. But in Canada, all food is supplied by the dockyard which saves some difficulties in accounting on board but is subject to some abuses and takes no cognizance on the requirements or preferences of very small ships.

On the 13th of February the following letter was addressed to the NOIC, Halifax, then our administrative authority:

"The health of Fairmile crews is appreciably deteriorating under the difficulties of preparing, under adverse conditions at sea, the types of food supplied.

2. It is recommended that more eggs, kip-pers, fresh fruit, minced beef, beef extracts and other highly nutritious and easily prepared food be supplied in generous quantities."

Hell was let loose. Signals flew about. Tele-phones rang. Surgeon Lt. Cdr. Newly Philpott, RCNVR, one of Montreal's leading obstetricians, arrived on the scene with a Sick Berth Attendant in a fast motor boat. He could not have been more agitated if he were about to deliver the Prime Minister of twins. Dr. Philpott had only recently joined the Navy and did a thorough job examining all officers and ratings and made certain recommendations. Individuals made complaints as to the quantities signed for but not supplied and the file increased in thickness as various remotely concerned officers appended their comments as to whether or not suitable food could or should be supplied to small ships for preparation in a pitching, tossing galley; whether the RCNVR should be fed at all or whether the whole matter should be referred to Vice Admiral Nelles, etc., etc. It all ended in my getting a blast for "complaining about the food supplied as it was always of the very best obtainable." Anyway, three weeks later I got command of the depot ship Seaborn—a large yacht that had previously been used as an office by Admiral Sir Bonham-Carter, RN, and the opportunity to start giving our boats some service. She was renamed HMCS Venture II. We got an able victualling staff including a good butcher who did marvels in providing the boats with meat in



SENIOR OFFICER FAIRMILES and Lieut. Bruton Strange, RCNVR, all dressed up for the photographer in a Fairmile wardroom. Food can be a serious problem on small ships.

handy shapes and sizes. For the first time in four months our men were being properly fed and for the first time we had bathing facilities for all hands.

I handed over command of Q 052 to Sub Lieut. Bruton Strange. He had Sub Lieutenants W. E. D. Atkinson and George Burrell to help him run this splendid ship with her fine crew.

I had now become a mother. I could sympathize with those dear women who provide meals, comforts and love for their offspring. Never did a real mother have less trouble with her kids than I. We were particularly fortunate with our officers and our crews and during the ten months I was Senior Officer Fairmiles our punishments could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

The truth of our success lay in the fact that any good man who misbehaved himself was warned that he might be transferred. The poor workers were drafted away or got themselves sent elsewhere for it took a lot of intestinal fortitude to stick it out in Fairmiles especially during the Winter of 1941-1942 at Halifax. Weather conditions were appalling. Our work was deadly dull and our shore facilities either inadequate or entirely lacking. It was only when we got Venture II as a Mother Ship did things improve.

I took command of HMCS Venture II on the 6th of March under the administrative authority of NOIC Halifax, and the operational direction of the Extended Defense Officer which involved patrolling off Halifax in all sorts of weather and with no protection from easterly or northerly winds. We had days of zero weather when the temperature in the officers' quarters would hang around 50 degrees.

The following boats operated during the winters of 1941-1942 and were able to maintain patrol for approximately 28 days of each month:

- Q 050 C.O.'s Braidwood 21 Dec: Fraser 21 April: Grierson
- Q 052 C.O.'s MacLean 6 Mar: Strange 21 April: Robinson
- Q 053 C.O.'s Campbell 6 Mar: Garlick
- Q 060 C.O.'s Farncomb 21 Dec: Ellis 21 April: J. S. Davis

(Of the above officers, Jack Braidwood took a navigation course to return to us in the Spring, bringing Q 077 down. Hal Farncomb went to corvettes.) On a schedule that called for two boats at sea for two days and nights and two days and nights in harbour but in practice it was found, as I had estimated when planning the four-boat-division of the flotillas, that one boat was often in for repairs and defects of one sort or another. Consequently it worked out that frequently the boats did two days at sea and one in harbour and half that day was taken up in refuelling.

On paper I had Lieut. Claude Campbell, RCNVR, and Chief Skipper I. E. Abbott, RCNR, to do all the administration work of four operating boats, five boats fitting-out and more than twenty building all over the country that had to be provided with experienced officers and what crews we could find of suitable type. On paper we were in only fair shape to stand day on and day off in Venture II but we were so short of officers on the operating boats that very frequently—sometimes for as long as a week, Campbell and I had to go to sea in command of the boats—frequently changing from one Fairmile to another at sea. Lieut. Campbell left the last week in March to bring down Q 072.

It was seemingly impossible to get sufficient officers . . . yet officers awaiting appointments would

come to me and beg to be transferred to Fairmiles and all I could do was to tell them to see the Manning Commander—who did nothing as he apparently had orders to "starve me out."

As an example: signal was made to NOIC on the 24th of April giving the state of readiness of all boats:

- Q 050 No C.O.
- Q 052 Refueling
- Q 053 At sea
- Q 054 C.O. but no other officers
- Q 055 No officers
- Q 060 At sea
- Q 061 No officers

Nine officers short that day and only myself and Chief Skipper Ike Abbott to stand watch on the depot ship (night and day)—and that was not exceptional during the months of March and April. Neither Abbott nor myself were getting enough sleep and I was beginning to suffer from nervous indigestion from the hurried meals on various ships and Abbott ended up in hospital. On return to harbour I did not get the rest that was required but had to get on with my paper work.

Captain D, in the person of Captain G. R. Miles, RCN, and assisted by Commander J. C. Hibbard, RCN, took over on the first day of May. It was soon evident that a free Canadian Navy directed by the RCNVR was at an end. We had anticipated it for months, knew that the credit for our pioneer work would go to the RCN and not, where it rightly belonged, to the RCNVR.

In a week our "esprit de corps" was gone. Changes were made among officers without regard to their experience, qualifications or personal characteristics so important if they are to live together in a space approximately twelve by ten feet for months on end.

Officers, some of whom were nearly ready for command, were told that now things were different they would be held back no longer and were to be given command of new boats. Naturally these lads were overjoyed—until they arrived in Toronto and found they were not to get command after all.

On the 12th of June I was appointed to command HMCS Lynx that was to go to Sydney, Nova Scotia, as Mother Ship to whatever Fairmiles were based there.

I was no longer Senior Officer Fairmiles. That was of little importance. It was important, however, that no one remained in command to fight the submersion in the stagnant waters of the RCN of a vital, living group of officers and men anxious to engage the enemy rather than merely wait for the passing of the war and the return to pink gins at eleven-thirty and the day's work done at four o'clock.

No one else was appointed in my place. Because whoever filled that post would fight for his boats and the people that manned them as I had done. Someone who would fight for promotion of the men who deserved promotion, for the rating of Petty Officer and pay as Coxswain for the Leading Hand, promotion for the Chiefs to Warrant and Commissioned rank, Watchkeeping certificates for the officers and promotion to Lieutenant Commander for the Flotilla Leaders.

The permanent force did not want that again. They wanted control of everything especially appointments.

The Lynx needed some changes for her new role. I went on leave. On my return she was being broken up for scrap metal. A signal had been misread.

Captain Miles promised me command of another

Mother Ship but nothing came through from Ottawa.

The comradeship, hard work and loyalty given so generously by those who served with me in the Canadian Fairmiles was a reward finer than I felt that I deserved; and with that memory I was content to retire from a Service that should be great



EXPERIENCED boat builders at Fairmile building yards are not yet fully employed on much needed ships.

were it but directed by men of higher courage and character.

Much has been written of the pitifully meagre appropriations which various Canadian Governments have granted the Canadian Navy in times of peace. Democracy in its collective wisdom is generally sound in its estimate of values. The direction of the Canadian Navy has never inspired confidence.

Significant "Letters to the Editor" Reprinted from Last Issue of Boating WANTS REPRESENTATIVE NAVAL BOARD

"As long as the Department of Naval Services insists upon maintaining a very definite line of demarcation between those who are volunteers and those who are of the permanent force, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Naval Board should be enlarged to include able, independent officers from both volunteer branches of the Navy—the RCNR and the RCNVR.

Perhaps it is unusual to use the phrase "taxation without representation" when referring to the unsympathetic control that a half dozen permanent force naval officers exercise over the 45,000 officers and men who have given up their civilian careers for the duration of hostilities; yet the term is apt.

In matters of pay, employment, promotion, family allowances—in fact every single matter in the life of the volunteer sailor is dictated, not by men who are familiar with every day life in Canada, but by professional naval officers who have never in their lives known the trials and triumphs of seeking employment and making a living in the business world. In receipt of regular and sufficient government pay and living allowances from childhood, these men have no conception and little sympathy for those who have had to rely on ability and brains to find themselves a living.

We have built a navy of larger proportions than we planned. It is a "volunteers' navy" yet the control rests in the hands of a few whose rise to high rank has been entirely a matter of time fulfilled

rather than by any outstanding ability, either as seamen or as administrators of sea forces.

This state of affairs has been allowed to continue for too long. It is an obstacle that must be overcome before we have a fully efficient navy. Differences between the three branches, RCN, RCNR and RCNVR, are reducing the morale of officers and men to a degree that warrants investigation.

It will be argued that we are following the traditions of the British Navy. But are we? Canadians who have served on loan to the Royal Navy bring back stories from England that show the Old Country far more democratic, far more alive to the needs of today than is the Supreme Command of the Canadian Navy.

The ability, or otherwise, of our self-appointed Admirals to command ships at sea is not in question. What all volunteer navy men ask is the right to equal privileges in return for their greater sacrifices." Old Veteran.

ONE MAN AGAINST THE SEA

"We admire your courage but doubt your ability to beat the whole permanent force of the Canadian Navy. One man alone cannot defeat a couple of dozen Brass Hats who will not hesitate to bring every kind of pressure to bear upon you." Last War Veteran.

A journalist is not alone if he is capable of interpreting the opinions of others, even when they are held silent by regulations.

ASKS THAT TRUTH BE TOLD

"If you, Commander Andrew D. MacLean, RC NVR, won't tell the real story behind your resignation as Senior Officer Fairmiles in the Royal Canadian Navy, I shall and in your own magazine BOATING. As Editor you may print it or not as you please but you have, in the past, never hesitated to publish letters of interest regardless of where the chips may fall.

You, Commander Maclean, resigned your commission in the RCNVR because the permanent force officers of the RCN made your position untenable.

You left the navy because your wide knowledge of naval motor boats was spurned by men of colossal ignorance and high rank . . . because the officers and men under your command were not getting a square deal . . . because you could not get the equipment, the shore facilities so necessary for the proper maintenance of these boats . . . because the Fairmiles were not being used to the extent that they are capable of being used . . . because every move you made was blocked by the Brass Hats at Ottawa who will permit no RCNVR officer to accomplish anything.

That's the truth and you know it to be the truth and the men who were once under your command know it too.

I have a son serving in Fairmiles and know many of the young RCNVR officers in that branch of the navy. They need you more than ever. Will ye no come back again?" RCNVR Father.

There is a proper time and place where matters of this kind can be aired. I miss my association with the Fairmiles more than can be expressed. Perhaps one can do more for a better navy from the outside.



Bryson Shields and Douglas Van Patten attend Fairmile launching at Honey Harbour.

NO BOAT BUILDING POLICY

"As a boat builder who has had to hire and fire two complete staffs in this war because Ottawa does not know what it is going to order next or when, allow me to commend you for your recent editorials that point this out so forcibly." Boat Builder.

In last issue we stated that the wooden boat building industry of Canada has not yet been put on a war footing.

ASKS RCNVR ENJOY EQUAL PRIVILEGES WITH THE RCN

"The control that fewer than fifty permanent force officers of the Royal Canadian Navy have established over thirty-five thousand or more "hostilities only" officers and men, has assumed the proportions of a dangerous racket. The promotion they have awarded themselves is a scandal discussed among officers of the United Nations' navies; was raised in the House of Commons last session, and is likely to come up for discussion again.

The volunteer army officer long ago found a place for himself beside the professional soldier. The capable young business or professional man on joining the army has the opportunity of reaching the higher ranks in a surprisingly short time. In the Royal Canadian Air Force the "hostilities only" officers now hold the vast majority of important appointments and work so well with their permanent force brothers that the Empire Air Training Scheme has been a notable success.

They do things very differently in the "old school tie" family compacted Royal Canadian Navy. First of all, there are three separate kinds of Navy officers wearing three distinctive kinds of gold lace (to the continual confusion of army, air force and public) to distinguish between the permanent force naval officer, the professional merchant marine officer and the volunteer naval officer of non-professional experience.

The army did away with such distinction years ago and the air force never had it.

Thus we have three distinct navies with different uniforms, regulations and pay, as a source of friction and inefficiency which in time of war is inexcusable on any grounds.

Among the volunteers, both RCNR and RCNVR, there is much resentment that all the hard, dirty and dangerous jobs appear to be avoided by the officers of the Royal Canadian Navy, who are able to find themselves soft jobs in Ottawa or behind desks in the dockyards.

Promotions among RCNR and RCNVR officers beyond Lieutenant-Commander have been exceedingly few.

Take an imaginary case. Lieut. Snodgrass, RCN and Lieut. Robt. Brown, RCNVR, are both fit and capable of discharging their duties at sea in a creditable manner. Snodgrass, instead of putting into effect his knowledge of naval warfare that was taught him at some considerable public expense in times of peace, is running a big department in some naval base and never goes to sea. Brown, on the other hand, who made an outstanding success of just such a job in peace time as Snodgrass is managing so ineffectually in war, finds himself in command of a corvette in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Snodgrass, and certainly Brown, have got the kind of jobs they want—but can we now afford to have our business executives at sea and our trained seamen trying to be executives?

This is, however, no time to indulge in the merely critical. Let us put forward constructive suggestions as to how efficiency can be improved.

The following suggestions represent the result of many informal discussions among officers of all kinds—of Canadian, United Kingdom, Australian and United States navies, and is recommended for the most serious consideration of the Canadian Government that is spending many millions on ships and naval bases—and giving very little thought to the personal element, without which nothing can succeed in the measure necessary to win this war. The suggestions are that:

(1) All Canadian naval officers, whether now classified as RCN, RCNR or RCNVR, be listed together as RCN and wear the same distinctive lace as their rank entitles.

(2) All Canadian naval officers who have qualified as sea-going Watch Keepers wear on their left breast a strip of gold lace. (Compare with RAF and RCAF wing insignia to designate the qualified pilot.)

(3) All Canadian naval officers who have qualified both as Watch keepers and Navigators wear on their left breast an additional strip of gold lace.

(4) All qualified Canadian naval officers wear a thinner strip of gold lace on the left breast to signify they have qualified in some special branch such as gunnery, torpedo, anti-submarine, etc.

(5) All Canadian naval officers who have served more than six months in any calendar year in a sea-going ship wear a gold chevron for each period so served and those who have served ashore a half chevron for each year. (Such as was used in the last war by all three services.)

(6) All promotions to a higher rank and all appointments of importance be made only on the basis of merit, experience and service afloat, as adjudged by a committee composed of equal numbers of officers of equal rank from all the four sources, i.e., permanent force, retired RN officers serving as RCN

(temp.), volunteer officers from the merchant navy and from the non-professional list.

(7) No officer is to be commissioned in or retained in the "Special Branch" (non-seagoing) if he is fit to go to sea, nor is any officer under 35 years of age to hold a shore appointment.

(8) Promotions from the "lower deck" to warrant and commissioned rank to be increased substantially, especially in the engineering and technical branches.

(9) Confidential reports on officers to be shown to the officer concerned and initialled by him before forwarding to headquarters as is the practice in the other Canadian services.

(10) The Naval Board to have ten members of which, at least, five are officers from the four sources as laid down in paragraph (6) above.

That promotions have been largely made for reasons other than efficiency and sea-going service are better illustrated by the following cases:

Of the first 38 officers listed of RCN, RCNR and RCNVR as shown in Canadian Navy List dated 15th April, 1942:

—there have been 47 RCN promotions since September, 1939;

—there have been 21 RCNR promotions since September, 1939;

—there have been 11 RCNVR promotions since September, 1939.

The effectiveness of Canada's navy is limited by the fact that all key positions are held by RCN officers absolutely regardless of their fitness or otherwise to discharge such duties.

The promotion of certain RCNVR officers for political reasons has had a very adverse effect upon the whole navy."

Naval Volunteers' Ass'n.

Leading Editorial Reprinted from Last Issue of Boating

Once again the Naval Board, consisting of the permanent force Royal Canadian Navy—with no representation of the RCNR and the RCNVR that now constitute more than ninety-six per cent of the total strength, has seen to it that promotions and decorations, generous beyond all reason, have been awarded themselves.

Up until last April they awarded themselves four times as many important promotions, carrying generous pensions until death, as were given the officers and men of the volunteer service that left gainful employment to fight on the high seas.

Where increase of rank is necessary, we have no complaint—provided it is for the duration only and that the taxpayers shall not be burdened with the payment of pensions for six Admirals and a flock of Captains and Commanders—few of whom would ever have gone far in any other navy.

Before the war our naval strength was some 2,000 men—now it is about 50,000. What will it be after the war? Our recommendation is some 5,000 officers and men. Yet we have enough Brass Hats for a navy of 75,000 or more and an investment of over \$20,000,000 in buildings for a navy of 100,000; built at a time when labour and material was scarce.

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Half Truths and Evasions Feature Naval Minister's Reply to BOATING Charges

ANGRY PERSONAL ATTACK MADE ON EDITOR

Full Text of Macdonald's Astonishingly Inadequate Apology for Bungling of Fairmiles and the RCNVR Delivered in House of Commons, 17th February, 1943

Re Article "Fairmiles and Foul"

"This article purports to criticize the building and manning of Fairmile boats in Canada and their operation by the Royal Canadian Navy. The article was written by Andrew D. MacLean, Commander RCNVR, Retired. It is quite a long article. In places it expresses the writer's opinion. In others it purports to state facts. I shall not attempt to deal with every statement of opinion or with every insinuation contained in the article. I shall deal chiefly with what the writer alleges to be facts, and I shall make such comments on these statements as I can make from my own knowledge or from information supplied to me by officers of my Department or from other reliable sources.

SPECIAL TRAINING

One of the first statements which Mr. MacLean makes is with regard to the training of crews for these ships. On the first page of his article he says, "the senior officers of the Canadian Navy prefer to run things in their own particularly obscure manner . . . and make no difference between the training of Fairmile crews and the maintenance of the 600 hp. Hall-Scott engines than they do for men and the steam machinery of corvettes, minesweepers and destroyers." Again, on page 9 he says, "no special training was given our officers or men on being accepted volunteers for the Fairmile service."

These are MacLean's statements. What are the facts? The facts are that before any Fairmiles were completed in Canada, engine-room crews were given special training in the running and maintenance of Hall-Scott engines, which are the engines used in these boats. Beginning early in 1941 and going on until February, 1942, two Engineer Lieutenants, one Warrant Engineer and fifty-four specially selected Chief Motor Mechanics were sent to the Hall-Scott works in Berkeley, California, to undergo a complete course in the Hall-Scott type of engine. The men who were given this special training had, previous to their entry in the Navy, considerable experience with internal combustion engines, such as the Hall-Scott engines are. Upon completing this course one of these men was detailed to stand by each Canadian Fairmile as the machinery was being installed. One of these men was also a part of the crew of each vessel commissioned. As the shore repair staffs for Fairmiles at Halifax and Esquimalt became familiar with the maintenance and operation of the Fairmile machinery, it was found that training could be efficiently conducted in this country. Accordingly, the practice of

EDITOR REPLIES

Roman type: Hon. Angus Macdonald

Italic type: Editor A. D. MacLean

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sending men to the Hall-Scott Works was discontinued.

Officers and mechanics were trained by Hall-Scott but many never got to Fairmiles, and we had often to use partly trained mechanics. In two wars



MINISTER OF NAVAL SERVICES
favours RCN against RCNVR.

the British Admiralty found it absolutely essential that DECK officers and men be specially trained for small craft—which training is neglected in Canada. We said "Their building, operation and maintenance involve highly specialized knowledge and experience" — yet the Minister speaks only of the engineering branch. The whole burden of the first page of "Fairmiles and Foul" recommends, in effect, that all small motor craft should come under the command of a senior officer with a competent staff.

In addition to this training on the maintenance and operation of Fairmile machinery, the naval mechanical training establishments at Halifax, Esquimalt and Pictou ran special courses on internal combustion machinery. This was general training for the class of engine to which the Hall-Scott belongs.

On page 9 of the article Mr. MacLean says, "By August, 1942, out of more than thirty boats in commission only ten were fit for operational duties as a di-

rect result of Ottawa's failure to provide specialized training and adequate, specialized base facilities."

The fact is that in August, 1942, there was an adequate number of trained men available to operate each Fairmile in commission. In addition there was an adequate number of replacements available to take care of any emergency which might have arisen. A special branch of the Canadian Navy was established for internal combustion engine ships. This branch corresponds to the regular Stoker Branch in the Navy.

If an adequate number of trained men, base facilities and replacement parts were available, why then were not all thirty boats fit for operations?

CREWS BEFORE REQUIRED

Mr. MacLean alleges that in the Autumn of 1941, twelve officers and seventy-two men waited at Toronto for some six weeks before they could actually man the Fairmiles and bring them down through the Lake and River to the East Coast.

It must be pointed out here that the common practice is to send some officers and key ratings to every new ship some time before the ship is accepted. It is obvious that men cannot arrive on a new ship, accept her, commission her and begin to operate her all in one day. Some considerable period of instruction and of getting acquainted with the machinery is necessary.

The Fairmiles to which Mr. MacLean here refers were launched in July and August, 1941. It was fully expected that they would be ready for acceptance much earlier than they actually were ready. Delays were caused by the difficulty in securing equipment, some of which had to be got in the United States, and it was not until the first days in November that the ships could actually be taken over by the Canadian Navy and sailed for the East Coast.

The Minister contradicts himself. He stated a trained engineer "stood-by" each Fairmile as she was building—which is right and proper—but here admits that whole crews did "stand-by" for three months. He says nothing of the failure of the Construction Branch to keep the Manning Branch adequately posted as to their requirements.

Mr. MacLean states, further, that in the Spring of 1942 "twelve boats had complete crews provided three months before they were needed, or 192 officers and men with nothing to do for ninety days." My information is that this statement is directly contrary to the fact, and some reflection would seem to show that my information must be correct. The month of May is the first month in which wooden ships could

safely leave Great Lakes ports for the East Coast. If Mr. MacLean's statement is correct, it would mean that complete crews for these twelve boats had been sent to the Lakes in the month of February, when the rivers and Lakes are completely frozen over.

The crews left Halifax middle of April and did not clear the Great Lakes with their ships until June and July.

PAYING OFF CREWS

Mr. MacLean states that five boats were paid off in Halifax in December, 1941 "because of an artificial shortage of officers created by the opening of special schools before we had enough people to man the ships so urgently needed at sea."

The Canadian Navy had to make the best disposition possible out of the men in the Service. Its principal task then was and still is that of escort work across the Atlantic. Fairmiles cannot undertake a trans-Atlantic voyage as escorts. Corvettes and minesweepers were urgently required for this duty, and so, too, were officers and men to man them. In December, 1941 training facilities were not available to the same extent as they are today, and in view of the shortages of personnel, the Manning Commander at Halifax had to use the available men on the ships where they were most urgently needed. Hence, it was not the opening of special schools which deprived Fairmiles of crews in the winter of 1941. It was the urgent need of personnel for the larger ships which could be used as trans-Atlantic escorts.

Undergoing training in RCNVR depots across the country and eating their hearts out at shore bases, were hundreds of officers and men anxious to get to sea. Some of them were not fully trained but we could have trained them ourselves well enough for the emergency. We agree that the main duty was ocean convoys. But what about protection for the ships that were sunk and the lives that were lost just a few miles away from five de-commissioned Fairmiles? We repeat that there were enough officers and men available to man all the Fairmiles at that time and that these boats were urgently required at sea.

FAIRMILE DINGHIES

Mr. MacLean refers to this matter in the following words, "The dinghy supplied for the Canadian Fairmiles was a joke. Heavy beyond belief, it would not handle under oars or sail and was unsafe with more than two people on board."

The dinghies supplied for Fairmiles were built, as the Fairmiles were built, in accordance with designs worked out by the British Admiralty. It is not true to say that they would not handle under oars or sail. In this instance Mr. MacLean is giving an opinion, but I prefer to take against his, the view of the Director of Naval Operations, Captain H. N. Lay, an officer of vastly greater naval experience than Mr. MacLean, and an officer who has won two decorations in this war for his gallantry in actual naval operations. Captain Lay, after a visit paid to shipyards which were building Fairmiles, reported on the 27th October, 1941, as follows:

"I took particular notice of the ten foot dinghies which are supplied to the Fairmiles built. This boat is an extremely well built one, very strongly constructed, and should stand up very well to the handling it will receive during service. It is slightly on the heavy side, but as a davit is fitted for lower-

ing, it is considered that this is an advantage rather than a disadvantage."

The dinghy is a joke any way one looks at it. We featured it because, unlike some other fittings on the Fairmiles, it was not a "secret weapon".

Captain Lay will go down in yachting history as the man who liked the Fairmile dinghy—the ridicule of a thousand Fairmilers, every practical boat builder and every yachtsman.

It may be an Admiralty design but the Admiralty must be rather ashamed of it for they never put it on their Fairmiles. It is quite true that it will not "handle" under oars or sail—in spite of the Minister's statement to the contrary. We leave it to anyone who has seen a Fairmile dinghy at \$275.00 instead of a better boat at \$60.00.

FAIRMILE GUNS

On this point Mr. MacLean states on page 9 of article, "The guns supplied were from eighteen to thirty years old and the ammunition of United States origin and very doubtful history . . ."

As in the case of the dinghies, the armament supplied to Fairmiles was the same as that specified by the Admiralty for the same class of boats built for the Royal Navy. The guns for the Fairmile boats were obtained originally, in part from the Admiralty and in part from the United States Navy. The type



EDITOR OF BOATING MAGAZINE
head bloody but unbowed.

of gun fitted was the one deliberately planned to be fitted, as laid down in the plans and specifications received from the Admiralty. It is not a question here of having the perfect gun. It is the question of taking the best that you can get.

Since the Fairmiles were originally armed, I am happy to say that a better type of gun has become available, and these are being fitted in the Fairmiles. The problem of securing better armament for Fairmiles and for all other types of ships in the Canadian Navy is one which is constantly under review by competent gunnery experts and armament specialists. These men are in touch with the Royal Navy on the subject, and whenever better armament is available for any Canadian ship, it is procured.

Submarines have been known to fight it out on the surface and the Fairmiles, as originally armed, would have been easy prey. BOATING made no mistake in complaining about the firepower—

for by the Minister's own admission, new guns are now being fitted.

As an illustration of the attitude which Mr. MacLean has adopted throughout his article, reference may here be made to a photograph on page 11, which is captioned "Lesson in Fire Power for the RCN. Picture shows Fairmile of the Royal Navy on patrol in the North sea." I am advised that the vessel shown in the photograph is a Fairmile used against German E-boats, and that it is of a different class altogether from the Canadian Fairmile, which is an anti-submarine ship. It is strange that Mr. MacLean, who sets himself up as an expert on Fairmiles, could have made a mistake of this kind.

There are all types of Fairmiles used against E-boats—and against submarines. We made no mistake, in fact, the same guns are shown in the side view of a Fairmile designated as a D type on another page. The army could have loaned the navy guns back in September, 1941.

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

Mr. MacLean complains that we maintain the English standard voltage of 24 instead of the North American standard of 32 or 110, on our Fairmiles.

It may be said, in reply, that the electrical supply of 24 volts is not only in accordance with Admiralty design, but was also determined by the voltage of the generators supplied with the main engines. There was no option in the matter. We had to take the generators as they were or go without them.

It is true that two increases in electrical power supply have had to be made, but these changes have had to be made because of the introduction and development of new equipment since the original Fairmiles were designed. It must be remembered that the present-day supply of electrical equipment is very limited, and the retention of the 24 volt and the introduction of the additional 110 volt systems were the most feasible and economical arrangements which could be made in the circumstances.

One set of 24 volt starting batteries for the engines would have been sufficient and the ships' lighting and power circuits supplied by 110 volt batteries and dynamo driven by the auxiliary engine. We could have saved \$1,000.00 per boat and much grief if someone had used his head.

BREAKING UP OF THE LYNX

On page 30 of his article, Mr. MacLean states that on the 12th June he was appointed to command HMCS Lynx, which was to be the mother ship of certain Fairmiles, that he shortly afterwards went on leave, and that on his return the Lynx was being broken up for scrap metal. He goes on to say, "A signal had been misread."

Nothing could illustrate the general unreliability of the article better than the above-quoted statement of Mr. MacLean. While the Lynx has been condemned as unfit for service, and while her machinery has been taken out, she was not being broken up at the time he returned from leave, nor has she since been broken up for scrap metal. She is still lying at a dock in Harbour in Eastern Canada.

On my return from leave Lynx was being dismantled and her engines have been removed—yet the Minister says our statement "illustrates the general unreliability" of our charges. We challenge the Minister to produce the complete

and entire Lynx file for 1942. If she is dismantled and without engines why is she not being used for scrap?

DELAYS IN BUILDING FAIRMILES

In his article Mr. MacLean complains of delays in building Fairmiles due, as he claims, to lack of intelligent priorities on engines, tanks and fittings. He alleges that it takes two or three times as long to build these boats in Canada as it does in Britain.

I should be the last to deny that there have been delays in the shipbuilding program for Fairmiles. Here, it must be remembered, there was a new industry for Canada. New sources of supply had to be developed; new materials and new machinery had to be secured. Shipyards had to be built and their staffs had to be organized in almost all cases. There is bound to be delay in any country in such circumstances.

The industry was not new. There was nothing difficult in the building of Fairmiles by our better yacht yards.

Only one yard (Honey Harbour) had to be built out of seven in Ontario.

Few, if any, new sources of supply need have been developed—but new sources were developed for reasons that would appear to have been political.

In all cases the seven yards in Ontario had an adequate number of qualified men on call.

In Great Britain several designs of Fairmiles are produced. Canada produces Anti-submarine Fairmiles only. In Britain boats are constructed on the mass production principle, but even with this method it takes five or six months to complete a vessel. In Canada, Fairmiles are produced, as I have said, to the British design, and the first contracts were let here on the 17th December, 1940. The contractors were required to build the hulls only, the Department supplying the special equipment and machinery. In procuring this equipment and machinery, difficulties and delays were encountered, but in a war, where there are great demands upon mechanical production, these difficulties and delays are almost inevitable at first. I believe, however, that every shipbuilder will say that so far as the Naval Service is concerned, it has done its utmost to help out the situation.

Why in this mass-production country did we not mass produce? Instead, orders came in dribbles with the result that builders could not plan ahead. Repeat orders were placed months after ships were completed and in the interval much needed skilled boat builders were either idle or had secured employment in other industries.

In the first month of the building program, representatives of the Service met with the contractors to clear up problems presented by the plans and specifications, and this contact with the builders has been maintained ever since. We have many letters from builders expressing their appreciation for help received and there is no contrary expression on record.

How could a government contractor afford to be critical—yet we do know that at least one large boat builder spoke to the Minister personally about the difficulties of dealing with the officials of the Navy and the problems of late deliveries of gear and equipment.

As to the comparisons between the rate of building in England and Canada, England, as I have said, employs the mass production method, but even with this it takes five to six months to build

these boats. In Ontario, from the time the first keels were laid in early 1941 until the boats were commissioned, the average building time was 8½ months. In the case of one firm the time taken was six months six days, and last year one firm delivered one of these vessels in three months and twelve days from the laying of the keel. This is a splendid tribute to the zeal and skill of our shipbuilders.

BOATING has stated repeatedly that the Canadian Fairmile builders have done a magnificent job in the face of great difficulties—yet their rate of production, because mass production was not possible on the intermittent orders, fell below the English speed.

IDLE SHIPYARDS

In an editorial appearing in BOATING on page 6 it is said that "of the five Fairmile building yards in Ontario, two are very busy and three have no Fairmiles to build." The facts are that there are seven Fairmile builders in Ontario, and in all the seven yards, Fairmiles are in various stages of construction at this moment, to the total number of ten.

Here we are guilty of careless writing but our contention that the full strength of our boat yards is not yet mobilized stands unchallenged. The facts are these: Of the seven Fairmile building yards in Ontario, only Mac-Craft and Grew have orders to about 75% of their capacity. J. J. Taylor and Greavette have no orders on hand. Carling-Minett-Shields, Hunter and Midland have orders for only one boat each or about 35% of their capacity.

DELIVERY OF ENGINES

On page 13 of the article, Mr. MacLean alleges that engines were delivered to some yards six months before they were needed, while other builders could not get engines when they required them. There is no case known to me of delivery of engines to yards six months before they were required. As the engines were received by the Navy in Toronto, they were shipped to the builders where vessels were in the most advanced stage. There were some cases where builders who had been rather backward originally, eventually made more rapid progress, and some of these might have had to wait a short time for the engines, but never for six months.

We repeat our statement that boat builders were continually delayed by the late arrival of engines, tanks, shafts and other gear and that engines lay in yards that did not need them while yards that did could not be supplied. We did not say builders had to wait six months, but three to four would be correct.

ATTACK ON RCN

Throughout the whole article, as well as in an editorial comment, and in another article appearing on pages 40 and 41 [Page 40 is a letter from the Naval Volunteers' Ass'n and page 41 is an advertisement for O'Keefe's Ale!—Ed.] of BOATING, numerous slighting references are made to the Royal Canadian Navy, that is to say, to the permanent force. It is suggested, for example, that the Naval Board should have more RCNR and RCNVR representation. In this connection it may be observed that the Board of Admiralty in Great Britain has no reserve officers on it. The Canadian Naval Board is modelled on the British Board of Admiralty, with this difference that the Board of Admiralty is an executive body, whereas the Canadian Board is an advisory body to the

Minister of Naval Services. The Minister, under the Naval Services Act, has full executive authority corresponding to the authority exercised in England by the Board of Admiralty. There is a further difference and it is this, that the Secretary of the Naval Board in Canada is an officer of the RCNVR, whereas in Britain the Secretary is a permanent Civil Servant. The Canadian Naval Board consists of the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction, Chief of Naval Personnel, Chief of Naval Equipment and Supply, and Deputy Minister, with an RCNVR officer as Secretary.

This is Canada's Navy. Our problems, our resources in experienced naval officers, the proportion of volunteers to permanent force, are different from other countries as is our attitude to maintaining a large Navy in peace time. It is a Peoples' Navy, a Volunteers' Navy—yet the permanent force rule it regardless of the feeling that exists among the volunteers. The present Naval Board does not enjoy the confidence of the Navy and it should be reorganized at once.

It is alleged that the Board has awarded promotions and decorations to itself and to personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy in an improper or unfair way. I must point out that in the last promotions list, which appeared at New Years, 3.1% of the permanent RCN officers received promotions, 10.51% of the RCNR officers received promotions, and 4% of the RCNVR officers received promotions. In other words, the permanent RCN officers received proportionately fewer promotions than either of the other two branches of the Service.

The last promotion list (January 1943) was an agreeable surprise. The Minister had been subjected to the strongest representations from many sources and acted last New Year's Day with a sense of proportion. Reciting what was done one day does not answer the charge that four times as many important promotions had been given to the RCN than had been given the RCNVR up until our last available records, namely, April 1942. See letter elsewhere in this issue on this subject.

In any event the Naval Board does not make promotions. Recommendations for promotions are made in the first instance by the officers commanding ships and establishments. They are in the best position to know the merits of those serving under them. Their recommendations are then reviewed by a Promotions Board, which is a totally different body from the Naval Board. Finally, the recommendations of the Promotions Board are reviewed by the Minister, who has to make the final decision as to promotions.

Some appalling promotions have been made. Some, it can be assumed, were made by this mysterious Promotion Board, without the recommendation of commanding officers. Are there RCNR and RCNVR officers on this Promotion Board? We doubt it.

So far as decorations are concerned, 84 have gone to members of the RCN, 53 to members of the RCNR and 123 to members of the RCNVR.

The bulk of the RCNVR decorations were awarded on the recommendation of the Royal Navy where so many RCNVR officers are serving with distinction. The vast bulk of the RCN decorations it is assumed, as must be assumed by those who have not access

to the official records, were awarded on their own recommendation.

For example, a decoration was recently awarded to an RCN officer for organization work that was notoriously inefficient while an RCNVR officer doing a much bigger and better job was not recognized.

Again, the RCNVR constitutes 74% of the whole and would therefore be awarded more decorations.

It must be pointed out, both with regard to decorations and promotions, that at the beginning of the war, we had a very small Navy. The ships were manned mostly entirely by officers and men of the permanent force. They were the first to see action, and I think I can say safely that they were all keen to get into action. It took some time to develop officers and men in the two Reserve branches. The profession of a naval officer, as I have told this House before, is not one in which skill is acquired in a day, or a week, or a month. It is a matter of years. In the first days of the war, therefore, inevitably, the brunt of the work fell upon members of the permanent force. Now, however, members of the two Reserves have gained valuable experience. They are taking their place nobly in the battle-line, and as time goes on and the Navy increases in size, more and more of the work will fall on their shoulders. I know of no officer in the permanent service who would not gladly go to sea if the opportunity presented itself.

The old belief that it takes many years to make a useful naval officer is not held so sacred in this modern world. A generation ago the career naval officer received what was then a very superior technical training. Today, civilian graduates in science and engineering have a better background for the profession of a naval officer than have those who became naval officers before their education was completed.

Modern aerial warfare involves great technical skill, knowledge and practical experience—yet volunteer officers in the RAF and RCAF hold high rank and command with great distinction. The world moves on. Yet no major change in the education or training of the RCN officer has been made for three or more decades.

Lord Nelson had only a smattering of science and his men could not write. Today admirals are practical scientists and many sailors high school graduates.

It is alleged that we have too many high-ranking officers in the Canadian Navy. The Australian Navy, which is about one-half the size of the Canadian Navy, has five officers above the rank of Captain, while we have seven, so that we are well in line with the Navy of our sister Dominion. In comparison with the British Navy it can be said that we are too heavily staffed in the matter of higher ranking officers. Indeed, we are below the United Kingdom standard in this regard, for in the United Kingdom there are some one hundred and eighteen Admirals, while we have five,—a definitely smaller proportion.

This is Canada and this is our problem. There are, naturally, a large number of British Admirals active and retired from what was and is a huge navy with many command areas all over the world. These Admirals were made as a result of vast experience afloat in command of flotillas and squadrons. None of our senior officers have commanded more than a couple of destroyers at sea. I shall say nothing on the general

question of the propriety of such articles as those that appear in the January-February issue of BOATING, beyond this, that several of the statements may well be deemed to constitute an offence against the Defence of Canada Regulations. Such matters as details of the construction and armament of ships are not matters that in time of war, at least, are usually made the subject of newspaper or magazine articles. More especially is this true when a person acquires knowledge of these matters in the course of his service as an officer.

If the Government has the courage to prosecute by all means they should do so.

Above and beyond the particular matters to which I have referred I think it is necessary for me to say something about the writer of the article, himself. I regret the necessity for this step, but I believe that the necessity arises, because many people who have read his article, even though they may hear and read what I have said today, may still feel that there must be something wrong somewhere when a former officer takes what ought to be the very serious step of attacking his own service.

As the Minister suggests few people read of what transpires in the House of Commons—so we reprint his speech in BOATING to give him an additional audience of more than 10,000 readers! I did not attack my own service—the RCNVR; but the vicious control of the RCNVR by the RCN permanent force senior officers.

Let me say on this point that the total number of persons employed in Fairmiles at the moment is under one thousand, and this out of a total strength of approximately fifty thousand. The Fairmile fleet, with every consideration for what it has done, and with every appreciation of the gallantry and fidelity of its members, after all constitutes in men less than one-fiftieth of the total strength of the Canadian Navy.

A chain is only as strong as its weakest link and the administration of the Fairmiles leaves so much to be desired that it may be assumed that the rest of the navy is none too well managed.

Now a word about the author for his experience and ability are proper matters for consideration in a case of this kind. He has criticized the ability and the judgment of others. He cannot blame us if we look at his own talents and training. He is now in his 47th year. He has reached an age when service in small ships becomes very trying, as we have found by unfortunate experience with many other officers, who have passed beyond the vigour and resilience of youth. He served in the last war with the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve for about two years, first as a Probationary Sub-Lieutenant and later as a Lieutenant. His service was mostly in small ships in the Mediterranean Sea and his record was good. He commanded the Toronto Division of the RCNVR from 1927 to 1931, when he retired. In 1935, he was made a Lieutenant Commander on the Retired List. Just before the outbreak of the present war, he offered his services to the Canadian Navy. Subsequently he became attached to the Canadian Air Force. During the first nine months of the war, considerable correspondence went on between MacLean and Naval Service Headquarters, with the result that on July 13th, 1940, he was offered an appointment as Lieutenant Commander. He thought that this rank was not high

enough to induce him to leave the RCAF, and he felt that he should be a Commander. He was told that such an appointment was not possible, and he finally [immediately—Ed.] agreed to accept an appointment as Lieutenant Commander. In this capacity he arrived in England, on the 23rd of September, 1940, in charge of a group of yachtsmen. [See "Who Is This Guy MacLean" on page 42.—Ed.]

After spending some time at bases there, he was given command of a trawler. In December, 1940, he was appointed to the Staff of Rear Admiral Coastal Command, and from January to June, 1941, he was on the staff of Captain of Motor Launches at a United Kingdom port. The whole time which he spent at sea in United Kingdom waters in this war could not have exceeded two or three months. He returned to Canada in August, 1941.

At this point reference must again be made to certain parts of his article. He states on page 8 that he was sent back to Canada to help with the Fairmile sub-chasers that were building. There is no record whatever to show that he was sent to Canada, or asked for by Canada, for this purpose. [MacLean returned to Canada against his wishes at the request of Ottawa.—Ed.] Later on he refers to his experience as Acceptance Officer of the British Admiralty on Fairmile motor launches. I am informed by the British Admiralty that though he was on the staff of the Captain of Motor Launches and though he would have had certain duties in connection with Fairmiles under construction, he was never Admiralty Acceptance Officer for this type of craft. [MacLean was in charge of all Fairmiles undergoing Acceptance Trials.—Ed.]

We did not have the British reports on his work before us at the time of his return to Canada. As one Canadian Officer put it in his report on Commander MacLean, "We had to take him largely on his own valuation." At all events we placed him in charge of Fairmiles as Senior Officer Fairmiles. He was given a set of definite instructions and told to go ahead. For nine months he held this post. Now if the Fairmile situation is as bad as he says it is, should not he as Senior Officer Fairmiles have to bear some share of the blame. [No definite instructions were ever given in spite of repeated requests. My command was restricted to that of a Flotilla Leader and we challenge the Minister to produce any evidence to the contrary. Since MacLean has been publicly attacked by the Minister, he is entitled, as an officer on the Reserve of the RCNVR, to a formal Court Martial pertaining to his entire Service career. Let the Minister act.—Ed.]

PERSONAL ATTACK

I come now to what is perhaps the most significant comment I have to make, and it is this. I have looked over all the files relating to Commander MacLean's service, both here and in the United Kingdom. He has sneered and belittled the Canadian Navy so violently and so openly and he has lauded the British Navy so highly—and quite properly lauded it—that I expected to find in the records something to indicate that he stood very high in the opinion of the officials of the great British Navy.

What did I actually find? I found that his standing in British Naval circles was exactly the opposite of high. The reports by his Senior Canadian officers are not too flattering, but one of them,

at least, is fulsome when compared to the reports by officers of the Royal Navy. He was told in England, in answer to a request that he be given some sea service that an endeavour would be made to send him to sea, but that he would not be considered for a command.

These facts from the record and the further fact that his sea experience in this war is very limited will have to be borne in mind in valuing his article.

The above constitutes a particularly vicious personal attack upon a private citizen by a Cabinet Minister. We do not intend, for the present, or here, to defend ourselves from attacks of this type. The Minister of Defence for Naval Services, instead of answering criticism on his conduct of a public trust, descends to personalities.

I have only one word more to say. An editorial in the issue of BOATING for January-February, 1943, suggests that the House of Commons should demand an enquiry into the administration of the Navy.

I may inform BOATING — which

about a year ago was threatened by a Naval Officer with a libel action and which had to make an apology for its incorrect statements — I may inform BOATING that if this House of Commons wishes to order an enquiry into the administration of the Navy, either in respect of its management of Fairmiles or in any other particular, I shall be quite content. I have no fear whatever of the result.

These "incorrect statements" amounted to a clerical error in the official number of one boat. BOATING explained its error, did not apologize for the statements made, nor was it threatened with libel.

I have conceived the main function of the Canadian Navy up to the present time to be that of convoy work on the North Atlantic. It has other tasks on our Coasts and on other seas and more recently, as Honorable Members know, its work has been extended to the Mediterranean Sea, where some Canadian ships of war have already won distinction for themselves, and where one, unfortunately, has met its end with

a loss of thirty-five lives. The value of our naval contribution stands or falls on that work. A few weeks ago I stated publicly that more than 40 per cent of the burden of escorting convoys from these shores to the United Kingdom fell on the ships, the officers and the men of the Royal Canadian Navy. No matter what individuals may be attacked, or what innuendoes cast, or what opinions offered, this fact will remain outstanding, namely, that to organize and carry out such a program from small beginnings and under the stress of war conditions, is not a minor contribution to the war effort; it is not the sort of contribution that is made by inefficient, incompetent or careless men."

CONCLUSION

BOATING believes that of the few charges the Minister of Naval Service chose to answer, as above, — of the many more he allowed to go unanswered — we have shown that there are, as we stated, ample grounds for an investigation into the administration of the Navy.—Editor.

Yacht Club Activities

Edited by Mary Jellicomb

ASHBRIDGE'S BAY Y. C.

The long belated club banquet and trophy presentation night has at last been decided upon by the executives of the club and is scheduled to be held on Friday, February 23, 1943, at the Alpine Hotel, when the pennants and trophies will be presented to the winners of last season's racing.

The principal item on the night's program is expected to be in the person of our guest speaker, a very reputable yachtsman, known to all by his inimitable manner of "spinning a seafarin' yarn". It is expected that all members of the club, with the exception of those in the services, will be in attendance along with their friends and guests.

At the latest board meeting of the club a very interesting point was brought to the attention of those present in that we will have several, or shall we say many, vacancies in our group of active sailing members, which means there will be boats which should be sailing in the competitive racing, lying at their moorings. It has always been our custom to select the necessary crews for the boats from our junior members, giving them the opportunity to actively engage in sailing without the expense of purchasing a boat of their own. These junior members are young chaps, some still going to school, who come down to the club grounds in the early spring, when the covers come off the boats; make themselves acquainted with the members and express their desire to take part in sailboat racing. When the skipper selects a certain young fellow to sail with him for the season he is put to work helping with the outfitting and painting of the craft to have it in commission in time for the racing season. This practice gives the new member a general understanding of the boat and its equipment, building in him a keener sense of value of the boat and its gadgets.

When the sailing committee, comprised of the Rear Commodore and some of the new recruits, starts the first

The secretaries of yachting, boating and aquatic clubs are invited to make use of this space to inform their members of forthcoming events and to advise other yachtsmen of their activities. Copy for inclusion in next issue should reach BOATING by the first of each month.

race of the season the "crew" realizes the thrill of a sport which is bound to become his foremost diversion in life. One night a week is set aside for the junior members to skipper the boats themselves with their own crew in a race around the triangular course.

The majority of the sailors in the club obtained their start in the sailing game by coming down to the club and sailing as crew in one of the boats and today many of them own their own sailboats while others are sailing under the colors of their country in the RCNVR.

The club is extending a formal invitation to young potential sailors who desire to become yachtsmen to be down in the club grounds when the warm spring weather brings out the sandpaper and paint brushes, and the annual hum of excitement around the boats starts the season.

ARMDALE YACHT CLUB

As our Race report shows, we have experienced a most successful year, possibly due in some part to the gasoline restriction and excellent weather for sailing.

The Officers for the year 1943 are: Commodore, C. L. Cooley; Vice-Commodore, A. Guildford; Rear Commodore, W. C. Oxner; Treasurer, G. Demack; Secretary, H. E. Kearns.

ROYAL VANCOUVER

In the autumn of 1939 a live and energetic group of lady members of the club formed themselves into an auxiliary committee for the laudable purpose of comfort and succour for the person-

nel of the Navy. Their work from that time on has been an impressive credit to both themselves and to the club but — there has been friction. The complaints of the executive are first that the gals have declined to incorporate themselves as a society so as to relieve the club of responsibility for their undertakings. And second that their auxiliary grants membership to ladies not members of the club with the consequence that club members are dropping their subscriptions to the club in favor of the auxiliary and so retaining the privilege of membership without payment of dues.

Things apparently came to a head over a proposal to lease an hotel building for a hostel for the men of the forces. An undertaking involving a considerable liability. Apparently there was an unanimous failure on the part of the executive and the auxiliary to agree on this subject and it all ends up with the gals no longer being an auxiliary of the club and the club deprived of its ladies auxiliary. It seems a shame two such excellent organizations, mutually concerned in the same activities, should not have found a line of compromise and continued to play nicely together.

When in April 1942 the oil controller cracked down upon motor boat owners with his "eye-dropper" ration the immediate effect was to put out of action a very large fleet of power craft, large and small, on the Pacific Coast. Manifestly it was not worth their while to put their craft into commission. And so the boys got themselves together and volunteered for emergency duty such as evacuations "a la Dieppe", etc., if only they could be furnished with enough gas to keep their boats running. This was grudgingly granted with various restrictions designed to eliminate pleasure cruising. Various test cruises were held under watchful supervision. Apparently Mr. Cottrelle's "key hole peepers" were determined to find a pretext to convict

(Turn to page 41)